Si nce,the di sconti nui tyofpow ersuppl yi sasevere i nci dentdue to i tsconsequences,i ti sapparentthatFD Iattack can i nfli ctdam age to the physi cal system asw el l .I n anothersi tuati on,an FD Iattack m i ghthel p hackersto take advantage by changi ng pow erconsum pti on atsom e speci fic nodes, w hi ch w i l lresul ti n si gni ficanterrorsi n l oad forecasti ng and generati on pl anni ng. M ostofexi sti ng research w orksi n thi sfiel d are based on the si m pl i fied D C m odel ,e. g. ,Li u etal . 1 ,Bobba etal . 3 ,and Anw aretal . 4 .H ow ever,i t i si m portantforresearchersand i ndustri alprofessi onal sto understand the FD I' s steal thy capabi l i ty underthe AC-based practi calsetti ng m odel , w hi ch hasbeen w i del y depl oyed i n the i ndustry.I n thi spaper,a com prehensi ve FD Iattack desi gn schem e i spresented to exam i ne i tseffecti veness usi ngful l ynonl i nearAC pow erflow m odel .Thus,i ti sm uch m orechal l engi ngthan m ostoftheprevi ousw orksw hi ch w erepurel ybased on si m pl i fied l i neari zed D C-based m odel s.The proposed FD Iattack schem e hasbeen tested on a case study to assessi tscapabi l i ty to penetrate a com m erci all evelAC based SE package,Pow erFactory 2017 SP4 from D IgSILEN T 5 .As dem onstrated by the experi m entalresul ts,our proposed m ethod of FD Iattack hassuccessful l y expl oi ted a cri ti calvul nerabi l i ty i n the state-of-the-artBad D ata D etector(BD D )and pl ausi bi l i ty checki ng.Asboth the exi sti ng detecti on m ethodsw i th el ectri cal( forpl ausi bi l i ty checki ng)and stochasti c (forbad data rem ovi ng)basi s have fai l ed to accom pl i sh thei r m i ssi ons,new FD Iattack detecti on m echani sm sare needed.U nfortunatel y there exi stno real i sti cAC-based FD Iattack datasetpubl i cl y avai l abl e, w hi ch hasgreatl y hi ndered the rel evanttechnol ogy devel opm enti n term sofdesi gni ng new FD Iattack detecti on m echani sm sand thei reval uati on.
In orderto provi de a practi caltoolto eval uate FD Idetecti ng techni ques,a cyber-physi caldataseti sconstructed and rel eased publ i cl y.U nl i ke the case ofpure cyberspace envi ronm entw hi ch hasseveraldatasetsfortesti ng desi gn theori es(fori nstance KD D 6 ,D ARPA 7 ,AD FA-LD 8, 9 ,N G ID S-D S 10 ,etc. ) ,to thebestofourknow l edge,ourFD Idataseti sthe firsteverAC-based FD Idataset.Ithasbeen created w i th hi ghl yreal i sti csetti ngsasa resul tofa com bi nati on ofthe use ofan i ndustry-standard com m erci al -l evelpackage (Pow erFactory)asthe testpl atform ,a trusted source ofi nput data ( Austral i an Energy M arketO perator) ,and a sophi sti cated attack desi gn process presented i n thi spaper.W e al so provi de som e prel i m i nary anal ysesi n orderto dem onstrate the cause forthe fai l ure ofBD D equi pped w i th thi sSE package.
The pri m arycontri buti onsfrom thi spapercan be sum m ari zed asfol l ow s: The organi zati on ofthi spaperi ncl udessi x secti onsw i th the currentsecti on bei ng the i ntroducti on ofthe research probl em .Secti on 2 revi ew s vari ousrel ated w ork and al so provi desan assessm entofsom e popul arD C-based attack schem esagai nstAC-based SE.Secti on 3 presentsa comprehensi ve attack desi gn schem e based on the AC m odelofpow erflow s.Based on the proposed desi gn schem e,a l arge-scal e cyber-physi calFD I attackdataseti sgenerated w hi ch i sdescri bed i n Secti on 4.Secti on 5 provi desprel i m i naryanal ysi sfrom both el ectri caland stochasti cperspecti ves i n orderto hi ghl i ghtthe steal th qual i ty ofthe generated FD Idataset.Concl usi on and som e future researchesare gi ven i n Secti on 6. D uri ngthi speri od,severalresearch groupsal so publ i shed vari ousdefense strategi esagai nstFD Iattack,i ncl udi ngheuri sti c 18 ,protecti ngri ghtfrom the m easurem ent 3 ,Sparse O pti m i zati on 19 ,usi ng sequenti aldetector 20 oradapti ve CU SU M test 21 and even a graphi calm ethod 22 .Al lofthese defense schem esare pl anned w i th greatdetai l sand som e even m enti on the financi alconsequences 23 .These resul tshave greatl y contri buted to the advancem enti n thi sfiel d.H ow ever,w hetherornotsuch w orksare appl i cabl e forthe AC-m odelbased real i sti csystem si san open questi on.
PREV IO U S W O RK
Fori tssi m pl i ci ty,there i sno doubtthatthe D C-based m odeli sa good starti ng poi ntforFD Iresearch.W i th the devel opm entofcom puti ng technol ogy,the probl em ofcom putati onalcostorconvergence i ssue can no l ongerhi nderthe i m pl em entati on ofAC-based SE i n the EM S.By rem ovi ng severalsi m pl i fied assum pti ons,AC-based m odelcan provi de a betteresti m ated setofresul ts.Thi sfactcan be easi l yconfirm ed once w e i nvesti gate the fundam entalpow erflow equati onsand m easurem entm odelforeach type:
• D C m easurem entm odel :z = Hx + ǫ.
• AC pow erflow equati on: In thi sw ork,the processofi denti fyi ng FD Iattack area i sconducted by usi ng an extended admittance matrix Y bus .The extended Y bus foran n-bus system i s a m atri x thathas si ze ofn × (n + 1).I ts form ati on i s based on the hori zontalconcatenati on ofthe tradi ti onaladm i ttance m atri x Y bus w i th an addi ti onalcol um n,w hi ch hasthe i nform ati on aboutthe type ofthe node.El em entsofthe addi ti onalcol um n have val uesofei ther0 or±1, dependi ng upon w hethera busi sofno-i nj ecti on orpow eri nj ecti on type.The busthathaspow eri nj ecti on i sfurtherdi sti ngui shed by asi gn i n order to supportthe processofautom ati cdesi gn attack,w i th +1 denoti ng a l oad and -1 denoti ng a busw i th pow ergoi ng out.The Al gori thm 1 presents the area ofattack i denti ficati on process.
1. 1 A ttack A rea
A l gori thm 1 I denti fyi ng Area ofAttack After constructi ng al lthe constrai nt equati ons,the nextw ork i s to i denti fy w hi ch state vari abl e w i l lbe changed,w hi ch i s presented i n the Al gori thm 3.The num berofchangeabl e state vari abl esw i thi n an areaofattack dependson the type ofnode,such assl ack bus,PV bus,orl oad bus, w i thi n i t.Therefore,i fthe areaofattack w i th n nodescontai nsa sl ack bus,w hi ch al w ayshasfixed val ue forboth the vol tage m agni tude and vol tage angl e,i ti sapparentthatthe setofchangeabl e state vari abl esw i l lbe (2 × n − 2).Li kew i se,forthe exi stence ofa PV busi n an area ofattack w i th n nodes,the setofchangeabl e state vari abl esw i l lbe (2 × n − 1).Si nce the setofconstrai ntequati onsi snonl i near,an i terati ve num eri caltechni que and approxi m atesol uti onsareexpected.Forthatreason,therel ati onshi p betw een thenum berofequati onsand thenum berofunknow n orchangeabl estatevari abl esi si m portant.Forthesakeofsi m pl i ci tyi n thi sw ork,w e ai m atadesi gni ngprocessw i th the num berofconstrai ntequati onsbei ng equalto the num berofunknow ns.Thus,i fthe num berofchangeabl e state vari abl esi n the area ofattack i sgreaterthan the num berofconstrai nt equati ons,notevery val ue ofstate vari abl e w i l lbe m ani pul ated duri ng the attack desi gn process.
A l gori thm 3 I denti fyi ng changeabl e state vari abl es 
2 Case study -The W SCC' s9-busPow erSystem
The W SCC' s9-buspow ersystem 30 Forthe ni ne-bussystem ,gi ven the area ofattack asi denti fied above,the setofconstrai ntequati onsw i l lbe form ed asfol l ow s.Si nce there are tw o no-i nj ecti on nodes w i thi n the area ofattack,Bus 4 and Bus 7,the firstconstrai ntw i l lrenderfourequati ons i n total ,ΣP 4j = 0,ΣQ 4j = 0, ΣP 7j = 0,and ΣQ 7j = 0.I n addi ti on,the second constrai ntal w aysrenderstw o equati onsregardl essoftheconfigurati on ofthe system ,thustheset ofconstrai ntshassi x equati onsi n total .The com pl exi ty ofthe tw o equati onsbased on the second constrai ntdependsupon the num berofl oads, sourcesand branchesw i thi n the area ofattack.I n thi scase,there are si x branches,i ncl udi ng both transform erbranchesand l i nes,asw el lasthree l oadsand tw o sources.I n total ,there are el even term si n each equati on from the second constrai nt.The detai l ed form ati on ofeach equati on from the setofconstrai ntsi spresented asbel ow . FIG U RE 3 The extended Y bus m atri xforthe ni ne-bussystem and the processofi denti fyi ng area ofattack w i th centralnode i sBus5.
1) The firstconstrai ntforthe sum sofacti ve pow erand reacti ve pow eratno-i nj ecti on Bus4 and Bus7 P 41 + P 45 + P 46 = 0 (1)
P 72 + P 75 + P 78 = 0 (3)
2) Partsofthesecond constrai ntforthesum ofal lchangesi n acti veand reacti vepow eri nj ecti onsw i thi n theattackarea(Equati on (5) and Equati on (6) )and forthe sum ofal lchangesi n acti ve and reacti ve pow erl ossesofal lbranchesw i thi n the attack area(Equati on (7) and Equati on (8)) 27, 45, 46, 57, 78 (P ij L,new − P ij L,old ) (7) 27, 45, 46, 57, 78 
In the currentexam pl e ofthe ni ne-bussystem ,the areaofattack w i th si xequati onshasal ready been i denti fied.Am ongal lnodesw i thi n the area 
FD ID ATA G EN ERATIO N PRO CESSES
As dem onstrated i n the above experi m entalresul ts,ourattack desi gn can com pl etel y bypass the exi sti ng sophi sti cated BD D ofan SE package. 
1 N orm alsteady-state dataset
Si m i l arto vari oussam pl e system s,the ni ne-bussystem underi nvesti gati on hasonl y one l oadi ng data,correspondi ng to one steady state ofoperati on.Forthi sreason,a real i sti cdem and data w i l lbe used to renderdi fferentstatesofoperati on forthi ssystem .Am ong the avai l abl e dem and data from AEM O ,i ti sthe system ofTasm ani a State thatsharesa l otofsi m i l ari ti esw i th the ni ne-bus system .Therefore,the hi stori c dem and data for Tasm ani ai n 2018 i sem pl oyed to constructvari ousl oadi ng scenari osforthe W ECC ni ne-bussystem through a processofscal i ng dow n.
Aftercol l ecti ng enough data aboutl oad dem ands forthe system w here 52558 val ues ofdem and w ere created,the nexttask w as generati ng genui ne m easurem entval ues,w hi ch i n turn w i l lbecom e the i nputdataforthe SE process.Al though thi sw ork seem sto be si m pl e w i th the l oad flow cal cul ati on ofPow erFactory,i tturnsoutto be extrem el ytedi ousdue to the l arge vol um e ofi nputdata.The scri pti ng feature ofPow erFactory,D PL 
1 El ectri calperspecti ve

2 Stati sti calanal ysi sperspecti ve
The probl em ofesti m ati ng state vari abl esi ssol ved conti nuousl y w hi l e the bad data,i fexi sts,w i l lbe gradual l y excl uded from the setofi nputdata.
Thi sprocessi srepeated unti lthe setofi nputdata contai nsonl y suitable data,notj ustcorrect data.Thi si sa l oophol e thatattackerscan expl oi tto desi gn m ani pul ated m easurem entsto bypassthe BD D i n the SE package.M ore speci fical l y,asl ong asthe m ani pul ated val ues are system ati cal l y desi gned to be ascl ose aspossi bl e to the appropri ateval uesfrom the poi ntofvi ew ofthe package,the BD D w i l lconsi deri tasthe norm aldata.The key ofthi si ssue ori gi natesfrom the m echani sm ofthe BD D .
W hen i tcom esto the m easurem entval ues,i ti sapparentthattheycontai n errorsdue to vari ousreasons:configurati on oftransducers,w i ri ngor transm i tti ngi ssues,etc.I ti si m possi bl eto acqui retheexactval uesofboth m easurem entand thecorrespondi ngerrors.H ow ever,w eusual l yassum e thatthe acqui red val uesare cl ose to the true val ue w i th onl y a sm al ldi fference oferrorǫ asbel ow 33 :
The val uesofǫ are unknow n butassum ed to have a norm alprobabi l i ty densi ty functi on w i th zero m ean.Therefore,the resi dualJ( x)i n Equati on (10)m usthave the probabi l i ty densi ty functi on aschi -square di stri buti on 34 ,χ 2 (K)w i th K i sthe degree offreedom ,cal cul ated by Equati on (11) .
w here
• σ i :Standard devi ati on ofm easurem enti th .
• Nm:N um berofm easurem entsi n the system . 
CO N CLU SIO N A N D FU TU RE W O RK
In thi spaper,an AC m odelbased FD Iattack desi gn schem e i sproposed.A case study w i th i ndustri alstandard AC-based SE i sused to dem onstrate theschem e.TheBD D ,w hi ch i sspeci fical l yequi pped forthepurposeofdetecti ngand el i m i nati nganyi nappropri atedata,com pl etel yfai l ed to noti ce the exi stence ofm ani pul ated m easurem entsi n the setofi nputdata,even w hen they m ake up a m aj ori ty ofthe data.Thi sw ork di sti ngui shed i tsel f from vari ousw orksaboutD C-based SE,w hi ch i sonl y a si m pl i fied l i neari zed versi on ofthe AC counterpart.Severalw orksi n Secti on 2 al so brought outthe poorperform ance ofD C-based SE system s.W e have show n thatthe D C-based FD Iattackm odelw here m ostofexi sti ngw orksare based on i sunl i kel y successfuli n passi ng the AC-based com m erci al -scal e BD D m echani sm .
Tradi ti onal l y,StateEsti m ati on i sdepl oyed forthetransm i ssi on system onl y.H ow ever,asthei ntegrati on ofD i stri buted EnergyResourcesqui ckl y spreadsouti n recentyears,the i m pl em entati on ofSE i n the di stri buti on system i si ndi spensabl e.The new l y em erged di stri buti on system w i l lthen have a m uch m ore sophi sti cated structure w i th bi -di recti onalpow erflow s.Subsequentl y,the system m oni tori ng w ork w i l lbe m ore com pl i cated than i n thecl assi caldi stri buti on system w i th radi alfeederonl y.Thus,thesecuri tyconsi derati onsi n di stri buti on system sarei ndi spensabl eforfuture w ork.Si nce the structure ofdi stri buti on system i sgetti ng cl oserand cl oserto the transm i ssi on system (m eshed,vari ousl oadsand sources,etc. ), there exi stsan expectati on thatourproposed attackdesi gn i sappl i cabl e to acti ve di stri buti on asw el lasundetectabl e w i th the exi sti ngcom m erci al BD D m echani sm s.Therefore,ourcyber-physi caldatasetw i l lbe a val uabl e resource forthe purpose ofconducti ng research on system ' sdefense strategi es.The FD IdatasetTSE-D S can be acqui red by sendi ng em ai lto the correspondi ng authorProf .Ji ankun H u atJ. H u@ adfa. edu. au. 
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